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Claire M. Amodio* 
 
A few years ago, ancestry websites took the world by storm. Peo-
ple were fascinated with their history and heritage and wanted to 
find out more about where they came from. Then along came 
23andMe, which allowed people to not only unearth their familial 
roots, but also bring to light unknown medical conditions or predis-
positions to certain medical issues. 23andMe then took the unprec-
edented step of teaming up with a pharmaceutical company to create 
drugs with its users’ genetic information. After this announcement, 
some users were caught off guard, having had no idea that their 
genetic information—something so sensitive and uniquely personal 
to them—was being used to create drugs. While 23andMe presented 
this possibility in their Research Consent Document, it is clear that 
many users either did not read it or simply did not understand the 
terms of their participation. This begs the question: how do users 
effectively pull their genetic information from research they did not 
necessarily intend to participate in? 
Neither the current American statutory scheme nor property and 
contract case law provide these users with protection or any way  
to withdraw from all research they deem unacceptable. Courts have 
ruled that people who allow their genetic information to be used  
for research forfeit their property rights to it and that it is not rele-
vant if people did not read the consent form they agreed to, as  
 
*  Claire M. Amodio graduated from Fordham University School of Law in May of 
2020. She would like to thank her parents, Cecilia and Mike, for their unending support. 
She would also like to thank her advisor, Professor Kimani Paul-Emile, for her guidance 
throughout this process. Last but not least, she would like to thank Elliott Fink, Sara 
Mazurek, and the entire IPLJ staff for their help, guidance, and patience in getting this Note 
to the finish line. 
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long as they were put on notice of additional terms. Since these  
avenues for legal recourse are essentially blocked for users that 
want to reclaim their genetic information, they should instead  
pursue a clearer path. Examining gametic material jurisprudence— 
a similarly situated but more consumer-friendly area of law which 
involves disputes over the rights to the genetic information found in 
eggs, sperm, and embryos—may just reveal that new path.   
This Note examines the various issues 23andMe’s research pro-
gram presents for users who wish to fully remove their genetic in-
formation from 23andMe’s research given the current American 
statutory scheme and case law in various American jurisdictions. 
Under these legal frameworks, the courts do not look to the intent of 
the parties in deciding who has rights to the genetic material.  
Rather, courts look to whether there was a forfeiture, consent, and 
notice of terms. This is in spite of the well-documented fact that  
people often do not fully read or understand contracts, especially 
internet contracts, when they agree to them. In contrast, gametic 
material jurisprudence looks beyond contracts and certain acts to 
the intent of the donors in deciding who has rights to the gametic 
material. This legal framework recognizes the reality that people do 
not necessarily read or understand what they agree to when they 
allow their genetic material to be used in research and gives those 
who did not intend to participate in certain kinds of research a way 
to permanently reclaim their genetic material. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the personal genomics and biotechnology company 
23andMe launched.1 23andMe enables its users to submit a spit  
sample to the company, which analyzes it and creates an ancestry, 
health, or combination report based on the type of kit ordered.2 
23andMe, and companies like it, have surged in popularity in recent 
years as technology that can reveal our ancestry and origin has de-
veloped at a rapid pace.3 Users have been drawn to this service be-
cause “our DNA is a way to help us paint a story of who we are, 
understand what that means about our identity, and even dictate how 
 
1 Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED 
(Aug. 3, 2018, 3:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-
pharma-deal/ [https://perma.cc/LQ7Z-UFM2]; About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter. 
23andMe.com/company/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/C3G8-CHGG]; Nicole Wetsman, 
23andMe Sold the Rights to a Drug It Developed from Its Genetic Database, THE VERGE 
(Jan. 10, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/10/21060456/23andMe-
licensed-drug-developed-genetic-database-autoimmune-psoriasis-almirall [https://perma. 
cc/7N7M-7WVC]. 
2 How It Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/howitworks/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4TV6-44C4]. 
3 Sofia Sokolove, How Did DNA Kits Become So Popular—and What’s Next?, ALCADE 
(June 30, 2018, 2:24 PM), https://alcalde.texasexes.org/2018/06/how-did-dna-kits-
become-so-popular-and-whats-next/ [https://perma.cc/A5R2BY8U]. 
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we should move through the world.”4 It is not only a somewhat  
affordable way to learn whether one is predisposed to any diseases 
or other health problems, but also gives people a look into their—
and their family’s—genetic past.5 
In the midst of its meteoric rise in 2018, 23andMe teamed up 
with the huge pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, giving 
GlaxoSmithKline exclusive rights to 23andMe’s users’ data to  
create drugs.6 By 2018, however, 23andMe had already been sharing 
its users’ personal information with other pharmaceutical companies 
for three and a half years.7 Although 23andMe claims that 80% of 
its roughly 12,000,000 users agree to have their DNA used for  
research,8 many reported being “surprised and angry, unaware of 
what they had already signed (and spat) away.”9 Some users were 
also completely unaware that 23andMe retained virtually unfetter-
ed access to and control over their genetic information.10 While 
23andMe users must sign terms of service agreements that include 
information regarding the use of their DNA for various types of  
research,11 it is unclear whether they fully understand its ramifica-
tions, one of which being that the users cannot profit from any  




6 Molteni, supra note 1. 
7 Id. 
8 About Us, supra note 1. 
9 Molteni, supra note 1. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.; Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/about/tos/ 
[https://perma.cc/4LKS-PF3R]. 
12 Molteni, supra note 1; Research Consent Document, 23ANDME, https://www.23 
andMe.com/about/consent/ [https://perma.cc/5UYF-AGUN]; Valerie Gutmann Koch, 
Pgtandme: Social Networking-Based Genetic Testing and the Evolving Research Model, 
22 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 71 (2012); Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the 
Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics Exponentially Increases Informational 
Privacy Risks, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 143 (2017); Anne S.Y. Cheung, Moving Beyond 
Consent for Citizen Science in Big Data Health and Medical Research, 16 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 15, 23–25 (2018); J. Lyn Entrikin, Family Secrets and Relational Privacy: 
Protecting Not-So-Personal, Sensitive Information from Public Disclosure, 74 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 781, 867 (2020); JENS OMDAL, THE BATTLE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND PROGRESS: 
HOW GENOMIC COMPANIES PLAN TO MOVE INTO PERSONALIZED HEALTHCARE AND WHAT 
IT MEANS FOR YOUR PRIVACY (2020); Matthew Rimmer, 23andMe Inc.: Patent Law and 
Lifestyle Genetics, 22(1) J.L. INFO. & SCI. 132, 153–58 (2012). 
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Indeed, most Americans support human genetics research, believing 
it to be important for their own and the country’s overall health.13 
They are thus willing to “grant broad consent for future use of their 
genetic information.” 14 However, “[o]nce educated on privacy con-
cerns regarding genetic information, individuals are less likely to 
support public data availability.”15 
Current bodily property jurisprudence offers little protection for 
unwitting 23andMe users whose DNA has been used for research or 
drug development as significant deference is given to scientists en-
gaged in these endeavors, particularly with respect to novel genomic 
drugs and other therapies.16 This Note argues that because of evolv-
ing technological and scientific landscapes and the potential for 
DNA to be used for much more than drug development, courts 
should begin giving users more protection and control over their ge-
netic material. This could be achieved by encouraging courts to in-
vestigate users’ intent upon signing up for the service, determine 
whether users actually read or understood the service’s research 
contract when they signed it and uploaded their DNA to the site, and 
to eschew traditional contract jurisprudence in favor of a more nu-
anced approach. 
Part I examines 23andMe’s history, its Research Consent Docu-
ment, and the concerns and controversies surrounding the website’s 
research and storage of genetic information. Part II discusses the dif-
ferent types of internet contracts and how courts treat them, studies 
that show most internet users do not adequately read or understand 
internet contracts, and problems the average 23andMe user may en-
counter as a result. It also examines the legal implications of these 
problems; mainly that 23andMe users have no legal recourse to cor-
rect them. Part III argues that courts should look to the intent of the 
user and her understanding of the research contract when she signed 
 
13 Americans Strongly Support Human Genetics Research and Potential, SCI. DAILY 
(Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/01/200129091531.htm 
[https://perma.cc/84K9-EGCX]. 
14 Kelsey Russo, The Digital Life of Henrietta Lacks: Reforming the Regulation of 
Genetic Material, 38 J. LEGAL MED. 449, 467 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). 
15 Id. 
16 See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 146 (1990); 
Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); 
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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up for 23andMe, and further that they should eschew traditional con-
tracts jurisprudence in favor of the user in these cases. 
 
I. 23ANDME’S HISTORY, RESEARCH, AND CONTROVERSIES  
SURROUNDING ITS PRACTICES. 
This Part examines statutes and the attendant case law to demon-
strate that people do not have control over the disposition of their 
body parts once relinquished, except under very limited circum-
stances. Moreover, if they agreed to 23andMe’s Research Consent 
Document, they will most likely be held to it by the courts, leaving 
23andMe users with little to no legal recourse to reclaim their  
genetic information once they have given it to 23andMe and agreed 
to participate in their research. 
A. Factual Background 
1. The Evolution of 23andMe 
Gaining access to one’s own genetic information was not always 
simple or affordable.17 Once upon a time, unlocking the secrets of 
one’s own genetic material once was quite expensive and required 
direct access to experts in the field. Now, the evolution of technol-
ogy and an expanding market has allowed early genomics studies to 
transform into the current genetic information industry—one that 
provides users with a complex analysis of their genes through a sim-
ple cheek swab and email.18 Geneticist Michael Hammer conducted 
one of the first studies and discovered that a subset of Jewish men 
shared “distinctive genetic traits,” which he published in 1997.19 
Jewish men soon began contacting Hammer to see if they were part 
of the same subgroup.20 While initially hesitant, he began taking 
their cheek swabs to analyze the results and charging them to offset 
the cost.21 
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In 2003, Spencer Wells, an adjunct professor at the University 
of Texas, released the documentary Journey of Man with National 
Geographic and PBS; it showcased how he researched human mi-
gration patterns using the Y chromosome.22 People were intrigued.23 
In 2005, Wells launched the first direct-to-consumer genetic testing 
kit with The Genographic Project, which sequenced users’ DNA and 
gave them “deep ancestry insights.”24 The company sold 10,000 kits 
on the first day.25 
Due to the success of The Genographic Project, 23andMe 
launched in 2006.26 The company initially charged users $1,000 per 
kit, which proved to be prohibitively expensive for many potential 
customers.27 However, after the company lowered its prices, its 
share of the market increased dramatically.28 In 2012, Ancestry.com 
launched its own genomics company with AncestryDNA.29 By 
2015, 23andMe and Ancestry had tested over one million people; by 
2016, they reached over two million.30 In 2017, Illumina, the com-
pany that makes direct-to-consumer genetics technology for 
23andme and others, estimated that 7,000,000 people had been 
tested in that year alone.31 
Today, 23andMe is a powerhouse—it has penetrated pop culture  
and boasts millions of users, many of which describe having pro-
found experiences.32 23andMe posts stories to its blog about people 
who have learned more about themselves, their ancestry, and their 
health through its services.33 In one blog post, 23andMe interviewed 




24 Id.; The Genographic Project Geno 2.0 Next Generation Helix Product Privacy 
Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/legal/privacy/genogra 
phic/ [https://perma.cc/BM3W-K8JP]. 
25 Sokolove, supra note 3. 
26 Id.; About Us, supra note 1. 





32 See generally 23ANDME BLOG, https://blog.23andme.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
F27L-FZTU]. 
33 Id. 
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back his ancestry due to slavery.34 Once he took a 23andMe test, 
however, he was able to trace his roots back to Ghana, Nigeria, the 
Congo, and other parts of Africa.35 He told 23andMe that “[i]n that 
one moment, he felt connected.”36 In another blog post, Jessica Al-
gazi wrote how she used 23andMe and discovered she was carrying 
the BRCA1 gene, which greatly increases one’s chances of devel-
oping breast or ovarian cancer.37 Jessica recounted how she “dodged 
a bullet” and that there are “many women walking around with this 
risk, who, like me, would have never known of their own risk but 
for this test from 23andMe.”38 Powerful stories such as these may 
prompt anyone with difficulty tracing back through their ancestry or 
family’s medical history to use 23andMe to get a better picture of 
themselves and any possible health risks they may carry. 
In order for 23andMe users to have these profound experiences, 
they must first purchase a kit, collect a sample of their DNA, and 
send it back to receive their results. 23andMe offers various kits for 
users to choose from that differ based on price and services pro-
vided. One kit, for example, simply offers ancestry information, 
while another offers both ancestry information and health data.39 
Whatever the user chooses, 23andMe will have access to her DNA 
and genetic history once she sends in her spit swab.40 
 





37 Jessica Algazi, 23andMe Alerted Me to My BRCA1 Variant, 23ANDME  
(Dec. 6, 2019), https://blog.23andMe.com/23andMe-customer-stories/23andMe-alerted-
me-to-my-brca1-variant/ [https://perma.cc/7VF8-X3G7]. 
38 Id. 
39 There are two kinds of kits: (1) Ancestry + Traits Kit and (2) Health + Ancestry 
Service Kit. The Ancestry + Traits Kit is $99 and provides the user with an ancestry report 
including Ancestry Percentages (to the 0.1%), Automatic Family Tree Builder, 30+ Trait 
Reports, and DNA Relative Finder. The Health + Ancestry Service is $199 and includes 
everything in the Ancestry + Traits Kit plus 10+ Health Predisposition Reports, 5+ 
Wellness Reports, and 40+ Carrier Status Reports. Users can choose which kit is best for 
them based on their budget and what they are looking for out of 23andMe. Compare Our 
Services, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/compare-dna-tests/ [https://perma.cc/ 
J3WC-ERMU]. 
40 See id. 
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2. 23andMe’s Research Consent Document 
When a user signs up for a free 23andMe account, even if she 
did not provide her genetic information to the website, she automat-
ically agrees to both the Privacy Statement and the Terms of Ser-
vice.41 These state that the user completely waives her property 
rights in any research, products that result from research on her 
DNA, or any information the user provides to the site; the document 
also indemnifies 23andMe from any liability resulting from the use 
or disclosure of her genetic information.42 23andMe also provides 
users with a Research Consent Document, where the user allows 
23andMe to use her genetic information in research that supposedly 
aims to “[d]iscover genetic factors behind diseases and traits, 
[u]ncover connections among diseases and traits, [l]earn about hu-
man migration and population history through genetics, [and] 
[u]nderstand how people react to their personal genetic infor-
mation.”43 
In order for her DNA to be included in research, the 23andMe 
user must first agree to the Research Consent Document (the “Doc-
ument”).44 23andMe contends that about 80% of its users consent to 
research, which is roughly 9,600,000 people.45 It is unclear whether 
people consent because they want to help others or because they did 
not in fact read the Document before signing, or some mixture of 
both. It should be noted that the Document is ten pages when 
printed. 
 
41 Terms of Service, supra note 11.  
42 Id. 
43 Research Consent Document, supra note 12.  
44 Privacy Policy, 23ANDME, https://www.23andMe.com/en-int/about/privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/AG3B-ZM69]; Research Consent Document, supra note 12.  
45 About Us, supra note 1; Wetsman, supra note 1. 
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The Document can be found on 23andMe’s website before cre-
ating an account. The “key points” of the Document are listed before 
the rest of the agreement, presumably so users can quickly read what 
they are consenting to before they scroll to the bottom of the page 
and accept. Importantly, none of the key points mention anything 




46 Research Consent Document, supra note 12.  
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When the user agrees to participate, she agrees to allow 
23andMe researchers to use her genetic and self-reported infor-
mation in research and that she will, at her election, enter inform-
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ation about herself into the 23andMe features on its website.47  
The 23andMe research features include “surveys, individual ques-
tions, and other features” where the user enters information about 
herself.48 The Document provides that if the user does not feel com-
fortable providing certain information, she may elect not to answer  
that question and she can choose to take part in “all, some, or none 
of the surveys.”49 
Halfway through the Document, 23andMe informs the user of 
the kind of research it will be performing with her DNA.50 The Doc-
ument provides that the user’s genetic and self-reported information 
may be used to research: 
[L]inks between genetic markers, non-genetic mark-
ers, traits, diseases, behaviors and other characteris-
tics; human migrations or population history; or to 
assess how people respond to personal genetic infor-
mation. Discoveries made as a result of this research 
could be used to understand the basic causes of dis-
ease, develop drugs or other treatments and/or pre-
ventive measures, or predict a ’person’s risk of dis-
ease. The topics to be studied span a wide range of 
traits and conditions, from common to rare. The top-
ics include simple traits such as hair color or freckles, 
serious diseases such as Parkinson’s disease or dia-
betes, and less serious conditions such as migraine 
headaches or response to over-the-counter drugs. 
Some of these studies may be sponsored by or con-
ducted on behalf of third parties, such as non-profit 
foundations, academic institutions or pharmaceuti-
cal companies.”51 
The Document also provides information on the myriad of risks 
that can arise from allowing DNA to be used in research, but only 
 
47 Id.; see also Drabiak, supra note 12, at 155–59. 
48 Research Consent Document, supra note 12.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. (emphasis added). 
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starting on page seven.52 The risks vary in severity.53 Moreover, it 
states that if the user does consent to participate in research, she can 
choose not to take certain surveys.54 This gives users the choice to 
participate passively in research by just providing their genetic in-
formation or more actively by answering questions that might pro-
vide more insight to researchers. 
If users originally consented to research but have since changed 
their minds, the Document provides that they may withdraw all or 
some of their genetic and self-reported information from 23andMe 
research at any time, but if: 
[Y]ou withdraw all or some of your Genetic & Self-
Reported Information, 23andMe will prevent that in-
formation from being used in new 23andMe Re-
search initiated after 30 days from receipt of your re-
quest (it may take up to 30 days to withdraw your 
information after you withdraw your consent). Any 
research on your data that has been performed or 
published prior to this date will not be reversed, un-
done, or withdrawn.”55 
In other words, if the user originally consented to participate in 
research and then changes her mind, her information will only be 
removed from being considered for use in future research and will 
not be taken out of research that has begun before the 30-day period 
or that has already finished.56 
 
52 Id. 
53 Research Consent Document, supra note 12; see also Drabiak, supra note 12; Sarah 
Washburn, Controlling Your DNA: Privacy Concerns in Genomic Testing and the 
Uncertainty of Federal Regulation and Legislation, 18 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 22 
(2016); Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter: Extending the 
Third-Party Doctrine Beyond CSLI: A Consideration of IoT and DNA, 21 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 1, 44 (2019). 
54 Research Consent Document, supra note 12.  
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
56 See Drabiak, supra note 12. 
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B. Legal Background 
1. GINA 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) pro-
hibits employers from using genetic information to make employ-
ment decisions “such as hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, 
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”57  
There are no exceptions.58 Under GINA, genetic information in-
cludes: information about a person’s genetic tests; information about 
a family members’ genetic test; family medical history; requests for 
and receipt of genetic services by a person or a family member; and 
the genetic information of a fetus or embryo carried or legally held 
by a family member or other individual.59 According to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), an example of an 
employer illegally using genetic information would be “for an em-
ployer to reassign an employee from a job it believes is too stressful 
after learning of his family medical history of heart disease.”60 
23andMe mentions GINA in its Terms of Service when it warns 
users to be careful about sharing their genetic information with other 
people.61 The company states that few businesses or insurance com-
panies ask people for their genetic information, but as with anything, 
this could always change.62 Importantly, the company notes that 
while GINA has been in effect in the United States since 2008,  
“its protection against discrimination by employers and health in-
surance companies for employment and coverage issues has not 
been clearly established” and “does not cover life, long-term care, 
 
57 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-0000-4, FACT SHEET: 
GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT (2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
laws/guidance/fact-sheet-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act 
[https://perma.cc/WL37-L97S]; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff. 
58 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-0000-4, FACT SHEET: 





61 Terms of Service, supra note 11.  
62 Id. 
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or disability insurance providers.”63 23andMe further notes that 
while some states have laws protecting people’s genetic infor-
mation, many do not and suggests that the user consult a lawyer to 
fully understand the scope of the legal protection over her genetic 
information in her jurisdiction.64 
Further, 23andMe maintains that any genetic information users 
choose to share with their doctors may become part of their medical 
records and “through that route be accessible to other health care 
providers and/or insurance companies in the future.”65 Likewise, it 
advises that any genetic information the user shares with anyone 
may be against her interest and “[e]ven if you share Genetic Infor-
mation that has no or limited meaning today, that information could 
have greater meaning in the future as new discoveries are made.”66 
23andMe also advises that it may be considered fraud if the user’s 
insurance company asks if the user is aware of any health conditions 
from her genetic information and she does not disclose them.67 
23andMe’s specific mention of GINA in its Terms of Service is 
important for multiple reasons. First, it acknowledges that sharing 
genetic information can be risky and that, in the future, businesses 
and insurance companies could start asking for the user’s genetic 
information. Second, it acknowledges that while GINA is good law, 
its protection is not “clearly established” and it does not cover all 
types of insurance.68 23andMe is essentially warning its users that 
their genetic information may be used against them at a later date 
for insurance purposes and its protection cannot be guaranteed. In 
fact, the company goes on to recommend speaking to a lawyer to 
understand how the user’s genetic information may be protected in 
their jurisdiction.69 These sections of the Terms of Service are parti-
 
63 Id. (emphasis added); see also Leslie E. Wolf et al., The Web of Legal Protections for 
Participants in Genomic Research, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 35–36 (2019); Josef A. Mejido, 
Personalized Genomics: A Need for a Fiduciary Duty Remains, 37 RUTGERS COMPUT. & 
TECH. L.J. 281, 294 (2011); Kristi Harbord, Genetic Data Privacy Solutions in the GDPR, 
7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 269, 279 (2019). 
64 Terms of Service, supra note 11.  
65 Id. (emphasis added). 
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cularly significant because 23andMe acknowledges that the user’s 
genetic information may not be protected by law and that, even if it 
is, only a lawyer would be able to properly explain how or to what 
extent.70 Finally, while GINA offers some protection in the employ-
ment and insurance contexts, it does not offer any protection for  
research misuse.71 
2. HIPAA 
Generally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (“HIPAA”) provides fairly limited protection of genetic infor-
mation.72 Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996 and “included two pro-
visions that restricted group health insurers’ use of health-related in-
formation in making coverage decisions and setting premiums.”73 
Under HIPAA, genetic information cannot be used to make cover-
age decisions or to set premiums if it is “maintained by a health pro-
vider or health plan covered by [HIPAA].”74 Likewise, HIPAA de-
finitively states that “genetic information in the absence of a diag-
nosis cannot be considered a pre-existing condition.”75 
However, given the technological advancements since the pass-
ing of HIPAA and the rise of companies like 23andMe, which have 
started teaming up with drug companies, it is clear that HIPAA is 
not as expansive as necessary.76 Specifically, HIPPA does not forbid 
insurance companies from requesting genetic information from 
 
70 See id. 
71 See generally Dustin W. Massie, 23, My Employer & Me on Genetic Testing, Privacy, 
and Employment, 74-DEC BENCH & B. MINN. 12 (2017); Stephanie Bair, Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing: Learning from the Past and Looking Toward the Future, 67 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 413, 425–26 (2012); Colin McFerrin, DNA, Genetic Material, and a 
Look at Property Rights: Why You May Be Your Brother’s Keeper, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 967, 984–85 (2013); Eriq Gardner, Gene Swipe: Few DNA Labs Know Whether 
Chromosomes Are Yours or If You Stole Them, ABA (Aug. 1, 2011, 8:40 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/gene_swipe_few_dna_labs_know_whether
_chromosomes_are_yours_or_if_you_stole_ [https://perma.cc/K57E-QTPE]. 
72 McFerrin, supra note 71, at 983. 
73 Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, 50 HARV. J. ON LEG. 
41, 48 (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6. 
74 Slaughter, supra note 73, at 48. 
75 Id. 
76 See Genetic Information Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/ 
issues/genetic-information-privacy [https://perma.cc/4AJE-Z339]. 
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people they already insure or “using genetic information during the 
insurance underwriting process.”77 Likewise, HIPAA forbids health 
insurance companies from charging higher premiums “of an indi-
vidual within a group plan based on genetic makeup, [but] it allows 
insurers to charge the entire group a higher rate.”78 Perhaps most 
importantly, HIPAA does not limit the disclosure of genetic infor-
mation from third parties to insurance companies.79 
Given these facts, one might reasonably wonder—is it legal un-
der federal law for an insurance company to request a different per-
son’s genetic information from one of their insured.80 It would cer-
tainly be legal for insurance companies to use a 23andMe user’s ge-
netic information to charge her more as long as the insurance com-
panies charge the group with which she shares certain genetic char-
acteristics more.81 Additionally, HIPAA doesn’t appear to restrict 
23andMe from sending genetic information to insurance compa-
nies.82 Finally, HIPAA offers no protection for research misuse.83  
3. Case Law Regarding Control and Ownership Over  
Body Parts 
Courts have held that, generally, people do not have property 
rights in their own body parts once they give them up.84 In Moore v. 
Regents of University of California,85 Moore underwent treatment 
for hairy-cell leukemia at UCLA Medical Center and then under-
went a splenectomy at the advice of his doctor, Golde.86 He contin-
ued to go to UCLA and receive treatment—there, Golde withdrew 
blood, skin, bone marrow, and sperm samples from him.87 During 
this time, Golde performed research using Moore’s samples and 
 
77 Slaughter, supra note 73, at 48. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.; see also Wolf et al., supra note 63, at 76–77. 
80 See Slaughter, supra note 73, at 48. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See Wolf et al., supra note 63, at 77; McFerrin, supra note 71, at 983. 
84 See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990); Greenberg v. Miami 
Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Wash. Univ. v. 
Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2007). 
85 Moore, 51 Cal. 3d. 
86 Id. at 125–26. 
87 Id. at 126. 
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eventually created a cell-line, which he patented.88 Moore sued 
Golde and the Regents of California for conversion, which is a tort 
under property law “that protects against interference with posses-
sory and ownership interests in personal property.”89 
The court found, first, that there was no reported precedent sup-
porting Moore’s claim that he had an ownership right or a sufficient 
interest in his cells to warrant a conversion claim “either directly or 
by close analogy.”90 Next, the court found that California statutes 
severely limit “any continuing interest of a patient in excised cells”91 
and, finally, that UCLA’s patented cell-line and the products derived 
from it “cannot be Moore’s property.”92 
The court found that the cell-line and any products that derived 
from it could not be Moore’s property because they are “both factu-
ally and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body” 
and that federal law only permits patenting products of human inge-
nuity, not naturally occurring organisms such as cells taken from a 
body.93 Moreover, the Court refused to extend conversion to cover 
body parts because this may “hinder research by restricting access 
to the necessary raw materials.”94 Regents was the first in a string of 
decisions which held that people do not have property interests in 
their own body parts because it is unprecedented and granting such 
interests may ultimately harm productive research.95 
Years later, in Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Re-
search Institute, Inc., a court found that people “have no cognizable 
property interest in body tissue and genetic matter donated for re-
search under a theory of conversion” and therefore have no rights to 
a patent that resulted therefrom.96 The court also refused to extend 
the informed consent doctrine to cover disclosure of researchers’ 
 
88 Id. at 168 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 




93 Id. at 141–42. 
94 Id. at 144. 
95 See generally id.; Greenberg v. Miami Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 
2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007). 
96 Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
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economic interests in their own research because it “would have per-
nicious effects over medical research, as it would give each donor 
complete control over how medical research is used and who bene-
fits from that research.”97 Here, the court made a point of stating that 
not only do people not have property rights in their own body parts, 
but that research subjects do not have to be informed of researchers’ 
economic interests in the research they are conducting.98 The court 
was concerned about disclosure to research subjects primarily be-
cause of the possibility that the subjects may refuse to partake in 
research or try to exert more control over the research. The court 
expressed concern that this could potentially hinder scientific pro-
gress without acknowledging that the subjects may have an interest 
in the disposition of their bodily materials.99 
In another seminal case, Washington Univ. v. Catalona, the 
Court found that people who make “an informed decision to con-
tribute their biological materials voluntarily to a particular research 
institution for the purpose of medical research [do not] retain an 
ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or authorize the 
transfer of such materials to a third party.”100 Here, the Court once 
again emphasized that people who give their body parts to research 
do not have any ownership interest in those body parts. 
Washington University claimed that the research subjects made 
an inter-vivos gift to them which, under the law, requires that the 
proponent present the donor’s intent to make a gift the donor’s de-
livery of the property to the donee; and the donee’s acceptance and 
automatic ownership of the gift,101 The Court found that the individ-
uals did intend to make a gift to the university because they signed 
a consent form which “emphasized the voluntariness” of their par-
ticipation, described how they could decline to participate or “with-
draw consent at any time,”102 and because they were given bro-
chures that said they would be making “gifts” to the University.103 
 
97 Id. at 1070. 
98 Id. at 1070–71. 
99 Id. 
100 Catalona, 490 F.3d at 673. 
101 Id. at 674. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 671. 
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The Court also found that since the brochures described that the bod-
ily materials donated by participants could be shared with research-
ers outside of Washington University—without needing additional 
consent from the participants—this in turn sufficiently informed the 
participants that they were abandoning “the right to designate the 
particular destination of their biological materials” when they 
agreed to participate in the research.104 Further, the court found that 
the language in the brochure coupled with the consent form, could 
not “reasonably be characterized as reflecting the [participants’]  
intention either to entrust their samples solely to Dr. Catalona or  
to transfer the samples in some legal form other than a gift.”105  
The Court also found that the second and third elements were met.106 
C. Internet Contracts Jurisprudence 
Contract law also plays a part in 23andMe’s users experiences 
and possible legal recourse. Courts consistently find internet con-
tracts to be enforceable where users are put on notice of the con-
tracts’ terms. There are primarily four kinds of internet contracts: 
browsewrap, clickwrap, scrollwrap, and sign-in-wrap.107 Browse-
wrap is a type of contract where the website determines that a user 
assents “merely by using the site.”108 A clickwrap contract is where 
the user “must click ‘I agree,’ but [does] not necessarily view the 
contract to which she is assenting.”109 In a scrollwrap contract, the 
user must “physically scroll through an internet agreement and click 
on a separate ‘I agree’ button in order to assent to the terms and 
conditions of the host website.”110 Finally, Sign-in-wrap is a type  
of contract where the user essentially assents to the terms of the  
website by “signing up for use of the site’s services.”111 23andMe’s  
Research Consent Document falls under the scrollwrap definition 
 
104 Id. at 674–75. 
105 Id. at 675. 
106 Id. 
107 Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
108 Applebaum v. Lyft, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 454, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Berkson, 
97 F. Supp. 3d at 394–95). 
109 Id.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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because it requires the user to scroll all the way to the end of the 
agreement and click “I agree” to consent to the terms. 
Courts almost always find that scrollwrap agreements, which re-
quire the user to scroll down through the contract and click “I agree” 
to assent to its terms,112 to be enforceable “because they present the 
consumer with a ‘realistic opportunity’ to review the terms of the 
contract and they require a physical manifestation of assent.”113 For 
example, in Applebaum v. Lyft Inc., the court found that the user 
assented to Lyft’s arbitration agreement through a scrollwrap agree-
ment because he had the “realistic opportunity” to view the terms 
and consented.114 On the other hand, courts are skeptical of click-
wrap agreements, where the user has to click “I agree” but does not 
necessarily see the contract to which she is agreeing,115 because they 
do “not require the user to review the terms of the proposed agree-
ment.”116 However, even in these circumstances courts still gener-
ally find them enforceable because “‘[b]y requiring a physical man-
ifestation of assent, a user is said to be put on inquiry notice of the 
terms assented to.’”117 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit found the 
mandatory arbitration clause in 23andMe’s Terms of Service, which 
is a clickwrap agreement, to be enforceable.118 Traditionally, courts 
have found that the person agreeing to a contract does not neces-
sarily need to read its terms to be bound. The courts rely on this 
contracts jurisprudence in finding that, for internet contracts, to “be 
bound, an internet user need not actually read the terms and condi-
tions or click on a hyperlink that makes them available as long as 
she has notice of their existence.”119 
Internet contracts jurisprudence is significant because courts 
will find online contracts enforceable—sometimes even if the terms 
are not readily apparent—because users are put on some form of 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
114 Id. at 465. 
115 Id. at 465 (quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 394–95 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015)). 
116 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
117 Id.  
118 Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2016). 
119 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added); 
Entrikin, supra note 12, at 861. 
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notice of the terms and must assent to them.120 Additionally, and 
even more significantly, courts will find users bound by the contract 
they agreed to, even if they did not read or fully understand its terms, 
as long as they were on notice that there were terms to which they 
were agreeing.121 This means that hundreds of thousands of internet 
users will be bound to the terms of the contracts they assented to 
online, even if they did not read or actually understand them, simply 
because they were put “on notice” of the terms.122 
However, courts have noted that determining the classification 
of a contract—such as a scrollwrap or clickwrap agreement, for ex-
ample—or whether the user clicked a box does not end the inquiry 
of whether the user assented to the contract, for [a] court “cannot 
presume that a person who clicks on a box that appears on a…screen 
has notice of all contents not only of that page but of other content 
that requires further action (scrolling, following a link, etc.).”123  
Importantly, the “presentation of the online agreement matters” in 
determining whether the user was actually on notice of the existence 
of additional terms and “depends heavily on whether the design and 
content of that webpage rendered the existence of terms reasonably 
conspicuous’” to the user.124 Indeed, the “[c]larity and conspicuous-
ness” of the terms are crucial in determining whether the website 
secured the user’s informed assent.125 
In other words, courts cannot presume the user is on notice of 
terms that may require scrolling, for example, and should look to the 
presentation of the website to see if extra terms are reasonably con-
spicuous to the user.126 This gives courts some leeway to find that a 
clickwrap or scrollwrap agreement is not valid, especially if all of 
the terms are not reasonably conspicuous to the user. However, this 
tends to be a rare occurrence with internet contracts. 
 
120 Applebaum v. Lyft, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 454, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (internal citations 
omitted). 
121 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 232. 
122 Id. 
123 Applebaum, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 466 (internal quotations omitted). 
124 Id. (quoting Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233). 
125 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
126 Id. 
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Current legislation and case law do not recognize or protect peo-
ple’s property rights in their own genetic material. GINA, which 
specifically references genetic material, is a narrow statute, which 
protects people from employment discrimination based on their ge-
netic information.127 It does not protect against other forms of dis-
crimination based on genetic information or give people any reme-
dies if their genetic information is misused. HIPAA protects people 
from insurance companies charging higher premiums based on what 
is found in their genetic information but does not protect them in the 
event that their genetic information is misused in another way. Case 
law offers no protection either. Courts have repeatedly refused to 
recognize people’s property rights over their own body parts.128 
Moreover, courts repeatedly find that if users were put on notice of 
additional terms, they will be held to the internet contracts to which 
they agreed, even if they did not totally understand to what they were 
agreeing.129 However, some courts have taken a different approach 
when it comes to gametic material, the genetic information found in 
eggs, sperm, and embryos. 130 
 
II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT LAWS GOVERNING 23ANDME 
Currently, the law does not protect 23andMe users seeking to 
reclaim their genetic information. Although two federal statutes, the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) and the 
 
127  Fact Sheet: Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, EEOC, https://www.eeoc. 
gov/laws/guidance/fact-sheet-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act [https://perma.cc 
/LBL4-MPYJ]; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff. 
128 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 136–37 (1990); 
Greenberg v. Miami Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 
2003); Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2007). 
129     See, e.g., Applebaum v. Lyft, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 454, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Nicosia 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2016) 
130 See infra Section II.E.; Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), reh’g in part, No. 34, 1992 WL 
341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). See generally William Boulier, Sperm, Spleens, and Other 
Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 693 (1995); Erin Colleran, My Body, His Property?: Prescribing A Framework to 
Determine Ownership Interests in Directly Donated Human Organs, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 
1203 (2007); Mark Pawlowski, Property in Body Parts and Products of the Human Body, 
30 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 35, 48–49 (2009); Abigail Hoglund-Shen, Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing, Gamete Donation, and the Law, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 472, 477 (2017). 
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 
address the uses and misuses of information derived from DNA, 
these laws are inapplicable to 23andMe users’ situations. Moreover, 
courts have consistently held that people do not have property rights 
over their own body parts: once a person has relinquished a body 
part for research she no longer has any control over it.131 Addition-
ally, courts generally always hold people to the scrollwrap contracts 
they agreed to, even if they did not read or totally understand the 
contracts’ terms.132 
To provide a broad overview, 23andMe users who want their 
DNA pulled from research are not protected by the United States’ 
current statutory scheme, traditional body part ownership jurispru-
dence, or contracts jurisprudence. The almost complete inability for 
23andMe users to regain control over the disposition of their genetic 
material becomes extremely problematic once 23andMe begins to 
push the limits of the “consent” given to the company in its Research 
Consent Document. 
In sum, courts have held that research participants have no prop-
erty rights over their body parts once they have relinquished them to 
research.133 Courts have adhered to this jurisprudence because prec-
edent has established that byproducts of body parts are “factually 
and legally distinct from” the original body parts used to create 
them;134 that the extension of property rights to body parts will have 
an adverse effect on research;135 and that people who make an in-
formed decision to give up their bodily materials for research do not 
retain an ownership interest in them.136 This puts 23andMe users, 
such as Jane, in a difficult position to mount a conversion claim, 
because they have technically made an informed decision, based on 
the Research Consent Document they signed and were supposed to 
 
131 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 136–37 (1990); Greenberg v. 
Miami Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Wash. 
Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2007). 
132 See Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 398–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Applebaum 
v. Lyft, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 454, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
133 See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136–37; Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074; Catalona, 490 
F.3d at 669. 
134 Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 141–42. 
135 Id. at 144; Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
136 Catalona, 490 F.3d at 674. 
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understand, to allow their genetic material to be used in research and 
have therefore relinquished any property rights they had to their ge-
netic material under the law. Because the courts have expressly re-
jected the notion that people who have allowed their body parts to 
be used in research have sufficient property rights over those body 
parts to warrant conversion claims, 23andMe users who want to pur-
sue this path are left with the difficult task of trying to convince the 
courts to overturn years of precedent to the contrary. 
Moreover, despite consistent findings that people fail to fully 
read or comprehend contracts,137 courts almost always find that 
when someone has the opportunity to read an internet contract, such 
as the case with scrollwrap agreements, that is sufficient to hold 
them to the terms of it, even if they did not read it or did not spend 
a sufficient amount of time reading it to understand it.138 This poses 
a problem for those like the 23andMe users in 2018 who did not 
realize, for example, they were agreeing to potential drug research 
and creation when they agreed that their genetic information could 
be used in research until the GlaxoSmithKline deal.139 This problem 
could become even greater if 23andMe begins pushing the bounda-
ries of the provisions in the Research Consent Document to research 
something far more controversial, such as cloning. 
This Part examines both and GINA and HIPAA, as well as the 
attendant case law, to demonstrate that people do not have control 
over the disposition of their body parts once relinquished, except 
under very limited circumstances. Moreover, if they agreed to 
23andMe’s Research Consent Document, they will most likely be 
held to it by the courts, leaving 23andMe users with little to no legal 
recourse to reclaim their genetic information once they have given 
it to 23andMe and agreed to participate in research. 
A. Hypothetical 
The lack of protection provided by current legislation and case 
law poses potentially large legal and ethical problems for 23andMe 
 
137 See infra Section II.E. 
138 See Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Applebaum v. Lyft, 
Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Nancy S. Kim, The Wrap Contract Morass, 44 
SW. L. REV. 309, 312–13 (2014). 
139 Molteni, supra note 1. 
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users. Consider the following hypothetical. Jane Smith is a Catholic 
woman with a history of leukemia in her family. Leukemia may or 
may not be genetic and Jane wants to see if she is at risk. After hear-
ing stories of people who used 23andMe to determine their predis-
position to certain illnesses, Jane decides to buy a kit and sign up for 
the service. She sends in her cheek swab and creates an account on 
23andMe’s website so that she may receive her results. While on the 
website, she sees that she can consent to have her DNA used in re-
search. Feeling compelled by her own family’s history of illness, she 
decides to consent in the hopes that the research may help people 
like herself and her family. She looks at the Research Consent Doc-
ument, reads the key points located at the top, skims the rest, and 
then clicks “I consent” at the bottom of the page. Jane occasionally 
provides more information about herself through surveys to 
23andMe throughout the years. She is not notified of any particular 
research that has taken place using her DNA. 
One day, years later, she sees on the news that 23andMe has 
performed research that has resulted in the beginning stages of clon-
ing certain body parts, so that people who have lost body parts or 
are born without them may receive these cloned versions instead of 
prosthetics. Jane knows that cloning is against her religion, and fears 
that her DNA may have been involved in this cloning project even 
though Jane did not think her DNA would be used for that type of 
research or intend for it to be. She goes onto the 23andMe website 
to withdraw her consent but is informed by the terms that her genetic 
information will only be withdrawn from future research and cannot 
be withdrawn from past research or research that has already begun. 
Jane is upset and looks into her legal options to get back control of 
her genetic information from 23andMe. She does research and dis-
covers that once a person has given up any type of body part for 
research, she cannot sue to get it back and that, in this context, her 
genetic information is not protected by either GINA or HIPAA. Re-
membering that she barely read the Research Consent Document, 
and therefore did not truly understand what she was signing up for, 
she researches whether she can say she did not really consent to the 
contract she signed and get her genetic information back that way. 
However, her research shows that most courts will hold her to the 
contract, even if she did not read the whole thing, because she was 
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technically given adequate notice of its terms. Jane has no legal re-
course to reacquire her genetic information and may have contrib-
uted to something directly against her religion as a result. 
The current legal landscape creates great problems for people 
like Jane Smith, who consented to research thinking that her DNA 
would be used one way while it was instead used for research which 
she finds objectionable. At present, there is no real legal recourse 
for Jane or those in similar situations. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that most people do not read contracts on the internet, yet courts do 
not recognize this reality.140 
B. 23andMe’s Research Consent Document Concerns 
23andMe’s Research Consent Document presents a plethora of 
concerns for its users who agree to it. To start, the document pro-
vides broad language about what kind of research in which users’ 
genetic information may be used, such as determining “the basic 
causes of disease, develop[ing] drugs or other treatments and/or pre-
ventive measures, or predict[ing] a ’person’s risk of disease” which 
“may be sponsored by or conducted on behalf of third parties, such 
as non-profit foundations, academic institutions or pharmaceutical 
companies.”141 
This means that 23andMe can use a user’s genetic information 
for a wide range of research topics, including diseases and migration 
patterns of certain peoples. However, it also provides that 23andMe 
can use this information to create drugs, medical treatments, and 
preventative measures. This provision is incredibly broad and  
 
140 See Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 394; Applebaum, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 465–66; Tompkins 
v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2016); Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 
F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2016); Paul J. Morrow, Cyberlaw: The Unconscionability / 
Unenforceability of Contracts (Shrink-Wrap, Clickwrap, and Browse-Wrap) on the 
Internet: A Multijurisdictional Analysis Showing the Need for Oversight, 11 U. PITT. J. 
TECH. L. POL’Y 7 (2011); Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on 
the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social 
Networking Services, 23 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 1 (2018); Caroline Cakebread, You’re 
Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service Agreements, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:30 
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-
without-reading-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/6PJB-EB63]. 
141 Research Consent Document, supra note 12.  
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allows for 23andMe not only to create drugs, as it already has,142  
but also to push the boundaries of what “treatments and/or preven-
tative measures” means all with users’ alleged “consent.” To put  
it another way, 23andMe can push the boundaries of ethical norms 
by stretching the meaning of treatments and preventative measures 
to include extreme measures such as cloning, all with people’s un-
witting consent. 
These provisions are on the fifth page of the ten-page Research 
Consent Document and after the initial “key points” portion that ap-
pears before the full agreement.143 The key points portion of the doc-
ument may discourage an average reader from reading beyond that 
point, figuring she can obtain all the information she needs from that 
section without having to read the entire document. But even if a 
user were to read beyond the key points, the information regarding 
use of genetic material for drug research is halfway through the doc-
ument, making it less likely that someone who even attempts to read 
the entire contract will see or remember the provision.144 
The document also explicitly provides information on the myr-
iad of risks that can arise from allowing DNA to be used in research, 
but only starting on page seven.145 The risks vary in severity.146 For 
instance, one of the risks is that survey questions or data compari-
sons may make the user or her family members uncomfortable.147 
However, there are much more severe risks, such as the potential for 
the user’s genetic information, survey responses, or personally iden-
tifiable information to be stolen in a security breach, which could be 
made public or released to insurance companies. This may create a 
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“negative effect on [the user’s] ability to obtain insurance cover-
age.”148 
Likewise, if the user or her family member has genetic infor-
mation linked to her own name or a family member’s name in a pub-
lic database, it is possible that someone who has access to her 
23andMe genetic information may be able to connect her genetic 
information to her or her family member’s name.149 This means that 
it is possible for someone to connect a user’s genetic information to 
her or her family, which poses great privacy risks, especially if the 
genetic information exposes sensitive information about the user. 
23andMe admits that it “cannot provide a 100% guarantee that your 
data will be safe” but claims to have “strong policies and procedures 
in place to minimize the possibility of a breach.”150 
The consent document also provides that researchers may pub-
lish results which include the user’s genetic and self-reported infor-
mation as part of a summary, lessening the chances of her personal 
information being exposed.151 However, while identification from 
summaries would be difficult, it is still possible “that a third party 
that has obtained some of [her] genetic data could compare that par-
tial data to the published results and infer some of [her] other per-
sonal information.”152 This means that it is possible, albeit unlikely, 
for third parties to identify the individual user’s personal inform-
ation even if it is published in a summary. The document further 
provides that “[t]here may be additional risks to participation that 
are currently unforeseeable.”153 In other words, users blindly sign 
up for risks that neither they nor 23andMe even know about yet.154 
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While the document thoroughly outlines the risks for users  
associated with providing their DNA for research, it is buried so 
deeply into the document that it is unlikely the average user would 
read to that point or read it carefully enough to truly understand what 
it means, like the other important provisions.155 This is exacerbated 
by the fact that the document is online and not printed out, making 
it less likely that someone will reach page seven—let alone read it 
in its entirety.156 
The document further states that even if the user did not consent 
to research, her information may still be used “for other purposes” 
described in the Privacy Statement but does not identify those other 
purposes.157 The user’s information may be used in ways she did not 
intend or to which she did not explicitly consent as a result of sign-
ing up for the website, and thus agreeing to the Terms of Service 
and Privacy Statement. 
Additionally, the document states that if the user does consent to 
participate in research, she can choose not to take certain surveys.158 
This gives a user the choice to participate passively in research by 
just providing her genetic information or to participate more actively 
where she can answer questions that might provide more insight to 
researchers. However, the user may not understand that she has a 
choice to take a more passive role. As a result, she may provide more 
information than she has to, thinking it is necessary or without un-
derstanding the true purpose. Significantly, users are unable to opt 
out of specific research initiatives; rather, they must agree broadly 
or not agree at all.159 
The document also provides that users who have consented to 
participate in research may withdraw all or some of her genetic and 
self-reported information from 23andMe research at any time. 
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However, if the user does withdraw, the user’s genetic information 
will only be removed from 23andMe’s research thirty days after it 
receives receipt of the withdrawal. Moreover, the user’s information 
will not be pulled from any research that has been “performed or 
published” before this date.160 This clause, combined with the in-
demnity clause in the Terms of Service, denies legal recourse to a 
user who wants her DNA pulled out of research. 161 Many of these 
provisions raise a plethora of concerns for users who agree to it. 
 First, the way the document is presented to users—with the key 
points before the rest of the contract—may discourage users from 
reading the whole thing. The key points section, in fact , does not 
list all the key points, as it fails to mention that users’ genetic infor-
mation could be used for pharmaceutical research. This could trap 
users into agreeing to terms they were discouraged from reading in 
the first place. Second, the definition of research is broad enough to 
cover topics which may not be widely accepted or considered ethical 
by the scientific community now, such as cloning, but may be in the 
future. This once again places users in positions where they may not 
have known what they were signing up for, even if they did read the 
whole contract, since these topics of research were not foreseeable 
at the time of consent. Third, while the document outlines the nu-
merous risks of taking part in research, these risks are not mentioned 
in detail until the last few pages. The broad language and the deeply 
buried provisions put users at great risk that their genetic infor-
mation will be used in a way in which they did not intend. 
C. 23andMe Research Concerns 
23andMe’s almost unfettered access to and control over its us-
ers’ genetic information is concerning for a myriad of reasons that 
implicate criminal, insurance, employment, information misuse, and 
cloning and broader research concerns. In the criminal context, 
23andMe says it will not give a user’s DNA to law enforcement 
without a subpoena or court order.162 However, the company does 
not say whether it can or will refuse to stop law enforcement from 
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using the site as does GEDmatch, a DNA and genealogy website 
that allows users to compare their DNA test results against other’s 
results.163 Law enforcement used GEDmatch to catch the Golden 
State Killer by creating an account and uploading the Golden State 
Killer’s DNA to deduce his identity from potential relatives already 
on the website.164 In fact, studies have shown that people generally 
do not understand the risk that the use of their DNA by law enforce-
ment poses to them.165 
23andMe’s practices also raise insurance and employment  
concerns. 23andMe says it does not give users’ information to em-
ployers.166 However, given that 23andMe has joined forces with 
GlaxoSmithKline to create drugs, it is quite possible that it will team 
up with an insurance company and sell users’ genetic information 
leading to people being insured based on their genetic infor-
mation.167 23andMe itself warns of the potential ways health insur-
ance companies or employers can access users’ genetic information, 
which are outside the scope of GINA.168 
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As with any information on the internet, there are always hack-
ing and blackmail concerns. 23andMe explains that there is a risk of 
users’ genetic information being compromised in the event of a data 
breach.169 Although the company claims to have put systems in 
place to make a breach unlikely, the possibility remains that hackers 
could access and use embarrassing or damaging information from a 
user’s DNA to blackmail or publicly humiliate her or her family 
members.170 Additionally, any de-identified information can be re-
identified, making this an even more likely possibility.171 
23andMe’s contracts also raise cloning concerns. It has become 
clear that 23andMe uses people’s DNA for research and drug devel-
opment without their full understanding.172 23andMe admits in its 
Research Consent Document that there are risks and benefits that 
are currently unforeseeable.173 Once the user has consented to  
research, 23andMe may research:  
[T]herapeutics development, conduct or support the 
development of drugs, diagnostics or devices to  
diagnose, predict or treat medical or other health  
conditions, work with public, private and/or non-
profit entities on genetic research initiatives, or oth-
erwise create, commercialize, and apply this new 
knowledge to improve health care.174  
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23andMe can also use its research “to understand the basic 
causes of disease, develop drugs or other treatments and/or preven-
tive measures, or predict a person’s risk of disease.”175 
This allows 23andMe to utilize users’ DNA in a wide range of 
initiatives that could one day include cloning, given the language 
that includes treatment of medical conditions and improvement of 
health care.176 While cloning may seem like a far-off dream, it is 
“[n]o longer the wackadoodle scheme it once was.”177 Technology 
is certainly evolving in such a way where it may be possible to clone 
human beings, if ethically sanctioned.178 For instance, various types 
of animals have already been cloned successfully.179 The first suc-
cessful cloning occurred in 1997 with the cloning of the sheep 
Dolly.180 In 2018, scientists in China successfully cloned monkeys 
for the first time.181 Recently, people have even been cloning their 
deceased dogs.182 Moreover, recent research has led to a 9% increase 
in the cloning of animal embryos that lead to successful live 
births.183 Not only will this increase the success rate of therapeutic 
cloning, where scientists or doctors inject skin cells from other peo-
ple into certain women’s removed eggs in order to clone small em-
bryos and create stem cells,184 but it will also increase the success 
rate of reproductive cloning, where a cloned version of an embryo 
is placed in a woman’s uterus to result in a pregnancy.185 
While there have been debates about whether cloning is ethical, 
some argue that there are various justifications for human cloning 
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including medical benefits,186 “such as growing new tissue and us-
ing genes to prevent or improve the treatment of diseases”187 as well 
as other the possible developments of “life-saving and life-enhanc-
ing technologies.”188 Likewise, human cloning may provide a way 
for couples facing infertility to have children.189 Scientists have also 
argued that “there are several potentially useful plant and animal 
technologies yet to be created which could also have vast human 
advantages.”190 All of these justifications fall under the language in 
23andMe’s research guidelines.191 
Given that there are ever-growing justifications for human clon-
ing, once the technology becomes available, 23andMe may very 
well begin using its users’ DNA to do it. The language in the Re-
search Consent Document certainly allows as much, as there are 
many medicinal and health-related justifications for cloning. While 
23andMe outlines some of these risks in its various contracts, it is 
safe to assume that most users do not know about them because peo-
ple generally do not read or understand online contracts.192 
The biggest concern, however, is 23andMe’s employment of  
its users’ genetic information in researching and creating drugs 
without their full understanding, knowledge, or consent.193 When 
users agree to have their genetic information used for research, they 
agree that “[d]iscoveries made as a result of this research could be 
used to understand the basic causes of disease, develop drugs or 
other treatments and/or preventive measures, or predict a person’s 
risk of disease” which may be sponsored by non-profit foundations, 
academic institutions, or pharmaceutical companies. 194 The lan-
guage in this provision is incredibly broad and opens the door for 
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23andMe to take its research to possibly extreme lengths, such as 
cloning, to create drugs, treatments, or preventative measures all 
with the “consent” of 80% of its users.195 While 23andMe also pro-
vides that users can withdraw their consent from research, it states 
that it will only prevent information from being used in new research 
initiated after thirty days from receipt of the user’s request but that 
any research on the user’s data “that has been performed or pub-
lished prior to this date will not be reversed, undone, or with-
drawn.”196 This means that anyone who discovers that their gen- 
etic information is being used in a way they did not intend will not  
have their information withdrawn from any previous studies, it will  
only not be used in future studies. This presents grave risks for users 
whose genetic information may be used in objectionable ways, such 
as cloning, that they did not understand they were signing up for and 
from which they cannot fully withdraw.197 
D. People Do Not Read Internet Contracts 
While the benefits and risks of DNA research may be great, 
23andMe users may not totally understand what they are signing  
up for because people simply do not read online contracts.198 Since 
users generally do not know what they’re signing up for, the  
marked absence of laws that prospectively regulate the use of DNA 
is problematic. Studies have shown that most people do not read 
“exculpatory provisions, forum selection clauses, or other provi-
sions in clickwrap/shrink-wrap or browser-wrap agreements.”199 
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And even if they do read the provisions, “most people do not under-
stand the language.”200 As a result, recourse is difficult because con-
tract law is fairly confusing and inconsistent from state to state.201 
A survey conducted by Deloitte of 2,000 US consumers found 
that “91% of people consent to legal terms and services conditions 
without reading them”202 and, even more stark, 97% of people ages 
eighteen to thirty-four agree to terms and conditions before reading 
them.203 Moreover, the language used in the terms and conditions 
are usually “too complex and long-winded for most.”204 
In another study conducted by professors Jonathan A. Obar and 
Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, two researchers created a fake social media 
site, NameDrop, to demonstrate that people do not really read con-
tracts online.205 The researchers put absurd “gotcha” clauses in 
NameDrop’s terms which stated that the company would share peo-
ple’s data with the National Security Agency and employers as well 
as take their first born children as payment for access to its social 
networking service.206 About 98% of people missed these clauses.207 
The researchers added the child clause, which approximately 93% 
of participants missed, specifically to show that it is difficult to pre-
dict the future uses and concerns by big data.208 
The researchers also collected data on how much time people 
spent reading the terms, if they ever reached them.209 The majority 
of people took a quick look and then scrolled to the bottom and 
clicked “accept.”210 Of those who did not automatically select  
the clickwrap and looked at the contracts to which they were agree-
ing, “96% spent less than 5 minutes on the [Privacy Policy] and  
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81% of those who read the Privacy Policy at all spent less than a 
minute reading it and 96% spent less than five minutes reading it.212  
Likewise, 86% of the people who read the Terms of Service spent 
less than a minute reading it while 98% spent less than five minutes 
reading it.213 
According to the researchers, the NameDrop Privacy Policy 
should have taken thirty minutes to read and the Terms of Service 
should have taken more than fifteen minutes.214 However, they 
found that some people who looked at the Privacy Policy and Terms 
of Service only spent less than five seconds on each.215 On average, 
though, participants spent seventy-four seconds reading the Privacy 
Policy and fifty-one seconds reading the Terms of Service.216 While 
the average reading times were still too short for what the Privacy 
Policy and Terms of Service required, the median reading times 
were a “more accurate representation of the general trend, at approx-
imately 14 seconds for both.”217 As the researchers state, “[f]ourteen 
seconds is hardly enough time to read, understand and provide in-
formed consent to policies between 4,000 and 8,000 words in length. 
Spending 14 seconds (or 60 seconds for that matter) is akin to not 
reading the policies at all.”218 
While the NameDrop study looked specifically at a fake social 
media site, it shows, along with the other studies, that people simply 
do not read online contracts. This begs the question: how can we 
expect people to really understand what they are accepting when 
they agree to participate in 23andMe’s research program? It has  
already been documented that people who signed up for the program 
did not understand what they were signing up for until they found 
out 23andMe teamed up with a pharmaceutical company.219 Even 
those who want to participate in research for the greater good feel 
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differently once educated on privacy concerns.220 It is thus likely 
that the vast majority of 23andMe users did not read or understand 
the consent documents before they “consented” to 23andMe’s  
research program.221 
23andMe users have no legal recourse if their DNA is used in a 
way they did not intend.222 There is very little statutory legal protec-
tion over genetic information in the United States.223 People do not 
have property rights over their own body parts, particularly after 
they have “relinquished” their body parts for research purposes, 
even if they did not totally understand what kind of research would 
be performed.224 Additionally, courts have continuously found that 
clickwrap and scrollwrap agreements, like the contracts found on 
23andMe’s website, are valid even if the users did not read the con-
tracts before agreeing to them.225 This is in direct contrast to social 
research which shows that the vast majority of people do not read 
online contracts or, if they do, spend very little time reading them.226 
This leaves 23andMe users who have allowed the company to use 
their genetic information for research purposes that they did not un-
derstand or in a way they did not intend without an avenue to remove 
their genetic information from research that is complete or already 
underway. 
E. Rights to Disposition of Gametic Material 
While courts usually refuse to recognize people’s ownership in 
their body parts once relinquished, courts have acknowledged that, 
because of their potential to create human life, parties have a special 
interest in their genetic material found in sperm and pre-embryos, 
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fertilized eggs created during invitro fertilization (“IVF”) that have 
not yet been gestated.227 When disputes about the use of such ga-
metic material arise, courts have taken one, or a combination, of the 
following three approaches: “(1) interpreting the parties’ contract or 
agreement regarding disposition of the pre-embryos” generally by 
looking to the parties’ intent; “(2) balancing the parties’ respective 
interests in receiving the pre-embryos; or (3) requiring the parties’ 
mutual contemporaneous consent regarding disposition of the pre-
embryos.”228 
In two seminal cases, Kass v. Kass and McQueen v. Gadberry, 
courts looked to the intent of the donors to determine the correct 
disposition of their gametic material.229 In Kass, the donors, a couple 
that had previously tried becoming pregnant through IVF, had got-
ten divorced.230 The wife wanted the pre-embryos created through 
the IVF process implanted in her and the husband wanted them  
donated for research purposes.231 The Kass court stressed the need 
for written agreements when embarking on IVF procedures to avoid 
litigation later on.232 However, the court also recognized that this 
venture is difficult because “[a]ll agreements looking to the future 
to some extent deal with the unknown.”233 These agreements are  
exacerbated by the uncertainties that flow naturally from IVF tech-
nology and process itself, including “cryopreservation, which ex-
tends the viability of pre-zygotes indefinitely and allows time for 
minds, and circumstances, to change” as well as divorce, aging, 
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death, or the incapacity of one or both donors that may inevitably 
change their outlook.234 The court most importantly recognized that 
“[t]he central issue is whether the consents clearly express the par-
ties’ intent regarding disposition of the pre-zygotes in the present 
circumstances.”235 
The court determined that the donors manifested an intent to do-
nate the pre-embryos for research upon review of the contracts that 
they signed at the beginning of the IVF process.236 The court looked 
at the consent agreements, which were provided by the IVF pro-
gram, that the couple signed and found that they had “signed con-
sents indicating their dispositional intent…[and] neither party dis-
pute[d] that they [were] an expression of their own intent regarding 
disposition of their pre-zygotes” or that they were illegal.237 When 
the couple signed these agreements and were provided with options 
on what the IVF program should do in case the couple no longer 
wished to proceed, they specifically initialed next to the option giv-
ing the pre-embryos to the program for research, clearly manifesting 
their intent.238 
The court emphasized that when determining if there is ambigu-
ity in an agreement, courts should look at the whole contract, the 
circumstances surrounding the contract, and the relationship be-
tween the parties.239 Importantly, courts should consider particular 
words, “not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the 
obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested 
thereby. Form should not prevail over substance and a sensible 
meaning of words should be sought.”240 The court thus instructed 
other courts to take the entire contract and its surrounding circum-
stances into account when deciding if there is ambiguity or not.241 
The court also recognized that particular words can be important but 
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should be considered within the context of the whole contract and 
how the words may manifest the intention of the parties.242 
In McQueen v. Gadberry, the wife wanted to keep the pre-em-
bryos and the husband wanted to give them away for research pur-
poses, to an infertile couple, or have them destroyed.243 The trial 
court originally awarded the pre-embryos to the two jointly and the 
wife appealed.244 The appellate court focused on the parties’ intent 
upon entering the contract that governed the disposition of the pre-
embryos.245 It identified some serious issues; the trial court found 
that the wife may have adjusted the disposition of the pre-embryos 
after her husband had initialed the page and that the two did not  
have any discussions about the pre-embryos before the divorce be-
gan.246 Additionally, and most importantly, the appellate court 
agreed with the trial court’s finding that the husband did not sign the 
contract “with the intent that [his wife] be awarded the frozen pre-
embryos in the event of a divorce.”247 
Taking the evidence into account, including the husband’s lack 
of intent, the appellate court concluded that “there was not sufficient 
disclosure allowing Gadberry to make a meaningful decision 
whether to waive any or all of his rights to the frozen pre-em-
bryos.”248 Therefore, the appellate court found that “the trial court’s 
findings of fact and credibility determinations regarding the circum-
stances surrounding the signing and initialing of the Directive indi-
cate it was not entered into freely, fairly, knowingly, understand-
ingly, and in good faith with full disclosure” but they affirmed the 
trial court’s order that the two could not do anything with the pre-
embryos unless they both consented.249 
Even when there is no pre-existing agreement over gametic  
material, courts have looked to outside factors to determine the in-
tent of the person as to whom his genetic material should be 
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awarded.250 In In re Zhu, a West Point cadet, Zhu, suffered a ski 
accident.251 He was declared brain dead and taken off life support, 
after which his organs were donated pursuant to his wishes.252 His 
parents then sued Westchester County Medical Center, where their 
son died, for retrieval of their son’s sperm.253 The court stated that 
to determine where the sperm should go, “the talisman must be the 
decedent’s intent.”254 While Zhu had not left any express instruc-
tions about what to do with his gametic material in the event of his 
death, the court gleaned his “presumed intent” from some of Zhu’s 
particular actions and statements made before his death.255 The court 
decided that there was presumed intent based on several factors in-
cluding Zhu’s organ donation card, his “devotion” to his family, and 
his conversations with various people where he expressed that he 
wanted children.256 The court held that, in light of these factors, 
Zhu’s parents were the correct parties to make decisions about his 
gametic material.257 
It is clear that courts take the intent of the donors of gametic 
material very seriously when determining its disposition due to its 
special potential to create life. This holds true not only where there 
have been disputes about whether signed agreements between par-
ties accurately reflected their intent as to the gametic material’s dis-
position, but also when there have been no agreements or directives 
at all. Courts clearly recognize that people have a special interest in 
their gametic material because of its great potential and take great 
care in determining its disposition and possession thereof. 
F. Havasupai Indian Case 
Institutions outside the legal sphere have also begun to recognize 
people’s rights to their own genetic material.258 In 1990, members 
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of the Havasupai Indian Tribe gave their genetic information in the 
form of blood samples to Arizona State University for the specific 
purpose of looking into the tribe’s predisposition to diabetes.259  
Instead, the University took the tribe members’ blood samples and 
researched their predispositions to mental illness and the geographic 
origins of the tribe,260 betraying the tribe’s trust.261 While some of 
the concern over the University’s research stemmed from tribe  
tradition,262 the tribe made clear they had not consented to the kind  
of research the University performed on their blood.263 This lack of 
consent stemmed from the tribe members’ lack of understanding, 
which was exacerbated by the fact that most of the tribe spoke  
English as a second language and did not have a high school educa-
tion.264 Therefore, the tribe members likely could not understand the 
consent agreement as well as a native speaker could.265 
In 2005, the tribe sued Arizona State University claiming a lack 
of informed consent and “that they donated biological materials 
solely for the purpose of diabetes research, so there was no consent 
to conduct other research.”266 However, the court held that there was 
“informed consent because the tribe members had agreed to give 
their blood voluntarily, and had signed a form granting blanket con-
sent for research ‘to study the causes of behavioral/medical disor-
ders.’”267 Additionally, it held that the tribe’s consent was not “made 
ineffective even if defendants did make fraudulent representations 
to induce that consent.”268 
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Although the case did not succeed in court, Arizona State Uni-
versity settled and paid $700,000 to forty-one Havasupai tribe mem-
bers, returned their blood samples, and provided “other forms of as-
sistance” in order to “remedy the wrong that was done.”269 Legal 
experts found this settlement to be significant because “it implied 
that the rights of research subjects can be violated when they are not 
fully informed about how their DNA might be used.”270 
It is clear here that the court, like many other courts, did not take 
into account the tribe’s unique circumstances when deciding 
whether the members actually gave informed consent or intended 
for their DNA to be tested for purposes beyond diabetes research.271 
The court simply decided that because the tribe members had signed 
the documents, they must have consented.272 However, the Univer-
sity’s settlement reflects how popular understanding of genetic in-
formation privacy and intent is changing by recognizing that the 
tribe did not intend for its DNA to be used beyond diabetes research 
and independently remedying that wrong.273 
There are certain similarities between the issues in the 
Havasupai case and the current problems faced by 23andMe users. 
While 23andMe users have wide educational and literacy ranges,  
all of the users share one thing in common: they are people agreeing 
to contracts on the internet. Although this is not the same as lack  
of education or ability to completely understand a certain language, 
studies have shown that most people do not read contracts online 
and, if they do, they spend too little time reading them or simply  
do not understand what they are agreeing to.274 Courts can look at 
the Havasupai Tribe settlement as a rare example of rectification in 
an all too common scenario—that is, when a sophisticated party uses 
contract law to take advantage of an unsophisticated party. Here, 
like some 23andMe users might reasonably assert, the sophisticated 
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party used the genetic information in ways to which the unsophisti-
cated party did not knowingly agree.275 
III. EVALUATING SOLUTIONS: PROPERTY LAW AND GAMETIC MATERIAL 
Users do not have any legal recourse if they decide they want 
their genetic information pulled from research studies that have al-
ready begun or begin less than thirty days after they have withdrawn 
consent.276 Thus, given the complete lack of avenues provided by 
the current statutory scheme, case law, and the studies that show 
most people do not read or understand internet contracts, it is prob-
able that 23andMe will use users’ genetic information in ways the 
users did not fully comprehend when they signed the Research Con-
sent Document and there will be no way to prevent it.277 
There are two viable avenues to legal recourse a user might pur-
sue to have their DNA pulled out of ongoing research at 23andMe. 
One option is for users to petition courts to recognize their genetic 
information as property and thus allow conversion claims under 
these limited circumstances. A more promising option—given the 
current jurisprudence—would be for users to petition courts to treat 
their genetic material like gametic material so they could have 
greater influence over its disposition. Additionally, 23andMe users 
could petition the courts to eschew current internet contracts juris-
prudence based on studies which show that most people do not read 
internet contracts.278 Litigants can also emphasize that 23andMe’s 
Research Consent Document presents far greater risks to 23andMe 
users than most other internet contracts that have been held valid by 
courts  
in the past. 
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A. Treat Body Parts as Traditional Property 
One possible form of legal recourse for 23andMe users is to  
petition courts to reject Moore jurisprudence and treat genetic infor-
mation as property that can be repossessed under property law.  
This could be a feasible form of legal recourse, especially if litigants 
can demonstrate to the courts that genetic information should be 
treated as property—specifically because of the extremely sensitive 
information that genetic material reveals about people from whom 
it originates—instead of just focusing on the idea that ownership 
rights should extend to those from whom the material originated.279 
This option would give plaintiffs a stronger claim to the genetic ma-
terial than 23andMe. Property rights may also give rise to “some due 
process claims to genetic material taken or used without her consent 
or knowledge of its removal,” mainly that people’s property cannot 
be taken from them without due process of law, which would further 
protect litigants from research misuse.280 
However, there are also numerous drawbacks to this solution. 
For one, having property rights over one’s body parts “does not en-
sure that one’s property will be protected under property rules.”281 
For example, under certain circumstances, the “‘owner can be 
forced to give up her property in return for compensation . . . set, 
often by a court, legislature, or administrative agency.’”282 This, in 
turn, might lead to people having their property taken from them 
without any compensation at all because a court or agency may set 
the compensation at zero.283 This problem has already sprung up in 
the context of newborn screening procedures, where states mandate 
blood samples to be taken from a newborn and screened without the 
parents’ knowledge or consent.284 The eschewal of consent without 
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compensation is considered to be justified by the public health ben-
efit and demonstrates that existing institutions do not respect the re-
lationship between property rights and genetic material.285 So while 
property rights continue to apply to people’s commonplace posses-
sions, like books, they do not apply to people’s genetic material. 
Additionally, in order to sue under property law, there must be 
an actual injury, so “the current judicial regime does little to protect 
individuals from harm before, or when, their genetic data is actually 
being used.”286 While there has been some success for litigants using 
property law, usually it does not succeed.287 In the case of 23andMe, 
if users’ genetic information has been used in research but no harm 
has occurred (such as theft), users could not sue under property law 
even if courts recognized their body parts as property. 
The awarding of property rights over body parts may also create 
problems for researchers. As courts have noted, allowing people to 
have property rights over their body parts might stifle innovation 
and scientific developments because it could restrict “access to the 
necessary raw materials” needed for research that could be poten-
tially helpful or lifesaving for others.288 Additionally, researchers—
and the companies that sponsor them—may be less inclined to “in-
vest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product 
when uncertainty about clear title exists.”289 These, of course, would 
lead to “an obvious harm to the public good” by limiting potential 
research and advancements that could help others in dire medical 
circumstances. 290 
While property rights over one’s body may be a good form of 
legal recourse for those who have already been harmed in some way 
by the use of their bodily or genetic material, it will not help those 
who may feel harmed but have not been legally harmed. 
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Additionally, even if 23andMe users successfully petition the courts 
to recognize property rights in their genetic material, courts may 
take the newborn screening approach that compensation is not nec-
essary for the taking of certain genetic material because of the public 
health benefits that result from 23andMe’s research on its users’ ge-
netic information. Finally, courts may be more inclined to find that 
genetic material is not really different from other body parts, like 
Moore, and be unwilling to take a position which may hinder scien-
tific research. While this may be a course of action worth exploring, 
it is unlikely courts would overturn years of jurisprudence and there-
fore is probably not the best solution. 
B. Proposed Solution: Treat DNA like Gametic Material and 
Eschew Current Online Contracts Jurisprudence 
The best legal recourse for users who want their DNA taken out 
of already commenced 23andMe research is to petition the courts to 
treat genetic material like gametic material. Users should ask the 
courts to take the gametic material approach of looking to the intent 
of the donor in deciding its disposition. Moreover, courts should es-
chew traditional online contracts jurisprudence for a more nuanced 
approach that takes into account the overwhelming evidence that 
people do not read or necessarily understand internet contracts and 
the significant risks 23andMe’s Research Consent Document poses 
for users. 
First, courts should treat DNA like gametic material because it 
has the “potential for human life.” 291 Cloning is becoming less of a 
whacky idea and more of a plausible route for scientific research.292 
Even if DNA is not currently used to entirely clone a human being, 
cloning and creating human embryos—however small—could be 
considered creating “human life” depending on one’s ethical 
views.293 With this consideration, courts should look to the intent of 
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23andMe users who pursue legal recourse to determine their intent 
in using the 23andMe website.294 While the Research Consent Doc-
ument itself may and should be considered a factor, courts can also 
look to what kind of kit the user bought, which may point to the 
user’s intent. For example, the buying of just an ancestry kit may 
point to use for entertainment or educational purposes and away 
from the intent to help others by providing one’s genetic information 
for research. The courts could also look outside the website to state-
ments the user made to other people, her participation in other re-
search studies or lack thereof, and whether she elected to be an organ 
donor to determine her intent.295 
When looking at the Research Consent Document itself, the 
court—like the courts in Kass and McQueen—should look to the 
intent of the users when executing the contracts and should look at 
the entire contract, considering the relationship of the parties, “and 
the circumstances under which it was executed.” Particular words 
should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the 
light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as 
manifested thereby.”296 Here, the Research Consent Document is 
executed is in an online format, where the user simply scrolls down 
and clicks “I agree” to consent. While this is technically an affirm-
ative sign of agreement, the fact that this takes place online probably 
means the users did not read all the terms before clicking “I 
agree.”297 Moreover, simply clicking “I agree” at the end of the web 
page is a lot different than initialing next to a specific option to  
indicate how the user would like her genetic material used or dis-
posed of. The latter would certainly indicate a stronger form of in-
tent due to the time it would take to look through the options and 
choose one.298 
Courts should also eschew traditional scrollwrap jurisprudence 
for the more refined understanding that most people do not read or 
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understand online contracts.299 Courts have traditionally held that a 
user does not need to read a contract in order to be bound by it, as 
long as she is on notice of its terms.300 As a result, courts consider 
scrollwrap agreements—where the user has to scroll all the way to 
the bottom of the page before they click “I accept”—to put people 
on notice and therefore bind them by their terms.301 However, these 
rulings put almost everyone who has agreed to a scrollwrap agree-
ment at a disadvantage because, as many studies have shown, people 
do not read the contracts they are agreeing to and even if they at-
tempt to read it, they either do not spend enough time to entirely 
read it or simply do not understand what they are agreeing to.302 
The court should also take into account that a user allowing her 
genetic information to remain in the hands of a company that is us-
ing it for research has risks which are vastly different than the risk 
of a user blindly agreeing to mandatory arbitration. While one con-
tract may result in an unpleasant proceeding at a venue one did not 
choose, the other may result in research that is eventually used for 
cloning, which may go against the user’s moral beliefs and raise a 
plethora of other concerns.303 
Given the risks users are exposing themselves to by agreeing that 
23andMe can use their DNA in research and the fact that most peo-
ple probably did not read or understand the terms, courts should  
not simply hold users to 23andMe’s Research Consent Document.  
Instead, they should look to each individual user’s intent when she 
signed up for 23andMe and agreed to research before determining 
whether the user should be bound by its terms. 
There are multiple benefits to this approach. First, 23andMe us-
ers will have legal recourse if their genetic information is used in a 
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way they did not intend for it to be used and will be able enforce its 
removal from 23andMe research that has already begun. Moreover, 
people will be in better control of their genetic material and compa-
nies will no longer be able to take advantage of people through 
scrollwrap agreements. It will also protect people from current un-
known risks that may present themselves in the future, such as the 
possibility of cloning.304 
There are also multiple drawbacks to this approach. First, there 
will be more judicial intervention and litigation over 23andMe con-
tracts. Likewise, finding the intent of the users will be on a case-by-
case basis, which would probably prevent a class action lawsuit and 
result in many individual lawsuits. This path may not be the most 
efficient, since only a select group of people have used 23andMe 
and will revoke consent for their DNA to be used in research.  
It is tailored enough, however, that it will not create a total upheaval 
in contracts law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We live in a society that tells us that, at the end of the day, sci-
entific research and contracts law are more important than the ability 
to enjoy decision-making authority over one’s own genetic infor-
mation. That is, in a word, crazy. Courts need to get with the times 
and acknowledge that many people in modern society share the most 
intimate details about themselves online, including their genetic in-
formation. This greatly increases the stakes under current bodily au-
tonomy and internet contracts jurisprudence, according to which in-
dividuals have virtually no say over what happens to their DNA once 
they have signed an internet contract that they likely did not read or 
understand. The time is now for courts to recognize that we live in 
a different world than we did 100—or even just twenty—years ago; 
there are new legal problems created by the advancement of tech-
nology that require new legal solutions. By following gametic ma-
terial jurisprudence and eschewing traditional contracts jurispru-
dence, courts can recognize the brave new world that we now inhabit 
and protect 23andMe users from having their genetic material used 
in ways they did not intend. 
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